What are people actually choosing?
Separate the visible actions from the underlying interests, constraints and outside options. Ask who is missing from the board.
INTERACTIVE / EIGHT STRATEGIC WORLDS / NO LEADERBOARDS
What if winning wasn't the whole game?
Change the incentives. Test cooperation. Watch trust grow, fracture or become irrelevant. Eight tiny games reveal a big idea: some conflicts create value, some divide it, and some need better rules—not better people.
An original learning experiment by Sahil Tayal · Part of sahiltayal.com
01 Outcomes are not identities02 Values are invented for teaching03 Real cooperation needs context
THE EXPERIMENT
Your tabletop strategy cabinet
Choose a game, change its rules, then play against a transparent programmed opponent. All payoffs are illustrative utility points—not money, forecasts or psychological assessments.
8 GAME WORLDS / 2 PLAYERS / MANY TRADE-OFFS
EXPERIMENT IN PROGRESSWORLD 01 / 08
SOCIAL DILEMMA
Prisoner's dilemma
LIVE PAYOFF MATRIX(YOU, THEM)
You choose a row; the counterpart chooses a column.
YOU ↓
THEM →
THEM →
A
B
A
3 / 3Both A
0 / 5You A · them B
B
5 / 0You B · them A
1 / 1Both B
Baseline matrix. The outcomes have invented values.
PLACE YOUR TOKENONE ROUND
Each of you chooses independently. The opponent's move is revealed after yours.
YOUR POINTS0
ROUNDS0
THEIR POINTS0
JOINT VALUE0
THE INTERPRETATION
No moves yet.
Choose a move above. This cabinet explains the incentives, not your personality.
ROUND HISTORY0 entries
- Nothing recorded. The table is yours.
LOOK BELOW THE SCORES
Why this game behaves this way
WHERE THE MODEL BREAKSQUESTION TO TAKE AWAY
CARRY THIS INTO REAL LIFE
The four-question field method
Use this when a team, family, classroom or community seems stuck. Start with the structure—not a verdict about anybody's character.
Who pays, who benefits, and when?
Sketch what each party gains or loses. Include delayed costs, unequal power and resources that do not show up in points.
Which rule would change the incentives?
Try credible commitments, smaller first moves, information sharing, fair cost allocation or a genuine right to exit.
Did joint value rise fairly?
A bigger total is not automatically a fairer outcome. Verify distribution, consent and unintended harms before declaring victory.
FREE / OPEN ACCESS / BRANDED PDF
Take the ideas off the screen.
A 16-page illustrated field guide you can save, print, teach from or bring into a difficult conversation. The value is in the questions—not in keeping you on this website.
- 8 explained dilemmas with matrices, traps and real-world caveats
- 6 cooperation design levers and when they backfire
- A complete worked example of redesigning a shared-project dilemma
- A printable worksheet for mapping your own strategic situation
- Reading references from foundational game theory and institutional research
No signup. No tracking pixels. 16 pages · Portable, searchable, print-ready.
THE INTELLECTUAL SHELF
What this lab borrows—and what it doesn't claim
These models are abstractions, not character tests or reliable predictions of organisations. Nash equilibria describe responses within specified games; Ostrom's work reminds us that institutions change the game. Read the originals.
FOUNDATIONS / SEPGame TheoryStrategic form, equilibrium, repeated games ↗
DEEP DIVE / SEPPrisoner's DilemmaVariations, repeated play, strategy limits ↗
INSTITUTIONS / NOBELOstrom and the CommonsHow shared resources can be governed ↗
COOPERATION / AXELRODThe Evolution of CooperationReciprocity and the shadow of the future ↗
Research links are reading references, not a claim that the toy points, modifiers or examples were empirically calibrated.
FROM THE SAHILVERSE
Keep exploring. Challenge an assumption.
Find the wider universe of research, writing, experiments and creative work at sahiltayal.com—or send a counterexample, correction or idea directly to Sahil.